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JUNE MEDICAL AND THE MARKS RULE
Owen P. Toepfer*
Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo’s mad againe.1

INTRODUCTION
In Thomas Kyd’s early Elizabethan play, The Spanish Tragedy, Don Hieronimo—a member of the King of Spain’s court—seeks to exact revenge on
the men who murdered his son, Horatio.2 When courtiers ask Hieronimo to
stage a play for them, he uses the opportunity to avenge his son in his madness.3 Because the murderers do not know that Hieronimo has found them
out, he is able to convince them to be actors in the play.4 Hieronimo suggests that each actor in the play speak a different language, and he replaces
the prop daggers with real daggers with which he murders the murderers
during the performance.5 After the play, Hieronimo cuts his own tongue out
so that he cannot speak under torture.6 A similar drama unfolds with respect
to the Marks rule and a recent Supreme Court case, June Medical Services
L.L.C. v. Russo.7
Over forty years ago in Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022; Bachelor of Classical
Languages and English, University of Kansas, 2019. I would like to thank my family for
their support as well as Professor O. Carter Snead, Elizabeth Totzke, and Josephine
Toepfer for their helpful comments, suggestions, and conversations. I would also like to
thank my peers on the Notre Dame Law Review for their thorough edits. All errors are mine.
1 T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND at l.431 (1922).
2 See THOMAS KYD, THE SPANISH TRAGEDY 95–99, 112 (Michael Neill ed., W.W. Norton
& Co. 2014) (c. 1582).
3 See id. at 95.
4 See id. at 96.
5 See id. at 99–100, 106.
6 See id. at 112; see also PETER B. MURRAY, THOMAS KYD 139–40 (Sylvia E. Bowman ed.,
1969) (positing that Hieronimo’s suggestion to have each character speak a different language allows him to speak freely about his revenge plot without the other courtiers understanding him and makes the court into a neo-Babel, marked by mutual incomprehension
and confusion).
7 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
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in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ ”8 For example, in a 4–1–4
decision (i.e., plurality-concurrence-dissent), the single-Justice concurrence will
become binding precedent if it is the “narrowest” of the two opinions supporting the judgment—even though the four-Justice plurality commanded
more votes.
Academics have decried the Marks rule as uneconomical, not administrable, and likely to create confusion among lower courts.9 Among judges,
Marks analysis has come to be known as a “vexing task.”10 Indeed, no agreement exists among the federal circuit courts of appeals on the definition of
“narrowest,”11 nor has the Supreme Court offered guidance by defining the
term—likely due in part to the fact that the Justices themselves often cannot
agree on how Marks applies.12 The confusion has led to the proliferation of
“Marks disputes”13 and a number of circuit splits.14 And as with any doctrine
whose content is contested and underdetermined among lower courts, the
single most outcome-determinative factor in a Marks-implicated case may
simply be the circuit that is deciding it.
A contingent of academics has recently been asking the Court to abolish—or at least clarify or alter—the Marks rule in recent years.15 In the face
of such supplication, the Court continues to cite the rule with approval and
without instruction on how to apply it.16 In its 2018, 2019, and 2020 opinions, the Court cited the rule four times in total17—a relatively high rate of
citational recurrence in the U.S. Reports.18 The Court, Hieronimo-like, has
8 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
9 See Section I.C for a review of the various critiques of the Marks rule.
10 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 431 (6th Cir.
2020) (quoting Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1994)).
11 See infra Section II.A.
12 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.) (“The dissent contends that . . . we risk defying Marks v. United States. . . . The parties realize what the
dissent does not: Marks has nothing to do with this case.”). In 2017 the Supreme Court
granted review in a case in order to clear up what the Marks rule entails, but the Court
ultimately resolved the case on other grounds and did not touch the Marks question. See
Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 (2018).
13 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1403 (defining a “Marks dispute” as a suit “where the litigants
duel over which opinion represents the narrowest and controlling one”).
14 See, e.g., Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1771–72 (reviewing the circuit split created by various
Marks analyses of the Court’s split decision in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011)).
15 See infra Section I.C.
16 But see Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1778–79 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (abandoning her
views expressed in concurrence in Freeman, 564 U.S. at 534–44, which certain courts found
to be narrowest under Marks, because they had “contributed to ongoing discord among
the lower courts, [and] sown confusion among litigants.”).
17 See id. at 1771; Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1121 (2019); Ramos, 140 S. Ct.
at 1403; June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2135 n.1 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
18 In comparison, the Supreme Court cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a
well-known and oft-cited case, only three times in the same span of time. See Ramos, 140 S.
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left lower courts in Babel and bitten out its tongue, refusing (for now) to
clarify the meaning of “narrowest.”
If one thing is clear, it is that the Marks rule is not going anywhere anytime soon.19 Lower courts must continue to contend with that one consequential word: narrowest. Courts are already doing so with respect to one
recent Supreme Court case from the 2019 term, June Medical Services L.L.C. v.
Russo, a 4–1–4 decision in which a majority of the Justices invalidated a Louisiana admitting privileges law called Act 620.20 Act 620 required every Louisiana abortion provider to obtain admitting privileges at a hospital within a
thirty-mile radius of the clinic at which he or she performed or induced abortions.21 Abortion providers brought a facial challenge questioning the constitutionality of Act 620, which was nearly identical to a Texas statute that the
Supreme Court invalidated in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt in 2016.22
In his plurality opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Breyer
voted to invalidate Act 620 by applying the benefits-burdens balancing test,
which he believes Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt requires.23 Chief Justice
Roberts, in a concurring opinion written for himself alone, supplied the fifth
judgment-supportive vote necessary for the law’s invalidation, but he instead
invoked stare decisis and applied the undue burden standard of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey24 as applied by Whole Woman’s
Ct. at 1412; Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1678 n.5 (2018); Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct.
1188, 1194 (2018).
19 A corollary derived from the inverse of the legal maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat lex
ipsa would be vivente ratione legis, vivit lex ipsa: as long as the law’s rationale endures, so does
the law. The animating rationale for the Marks rule—that a case ought to generate a
“single legal standard for the lower courts to apply in similar cases”—will obviously never
go away. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The question is whether there is a better standard by which to divine a split decision’s “single legal standard.” Id.
20 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2113, 2134.
21 LA. STAT. ANN. § 1061:10 (2016), invalidated by June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2113, 2134.
22 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016). Compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 1061:10(A)(2) (“On the
date the abortion is performed or induced, a physician performing or inducing an abortion shall [h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than
thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced and that
provides obstetrical or gynecological health care services.”), with TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2013), invalidated by Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at
2318 (“A physician performing or inducing an abortion must, on the date the abortion is
performed or induced, have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not
further than 30 miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced and
provides obstetrical or gynecological health care services.”).
23 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2112–13 (“In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt . . . [the
Court] explained that [Casey’s undue-burden] standard requires courts independently to
review the legislative findings upon which an abortion-related statute rests and to weigh the
law’s ‘asserted benefits against the burdens’ it imposes on abortion access.” (quoting Whole
Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310)).
24 505 U.S. at 874.
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Health.25 Crucially, the Chief Justice disagrees with the plurality’s contention
that Whole Woman’s Health augmented Casey’s undue burden standard.26
This Note, proceeding in three parts, describes the history of the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence, evaluates the current state of the Marks rule, and
demonstrates that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical is the
controlling opinion for Marks purposes under each definition of “narrowest”
that several federal circuit courts of appeals employ. Part I first traces the
historical arc of abortion jurisprudence from Roe v. Wade to June Medical and
thereafter provides background on the history of and academic reactions to
the Marks rule. Part II considers the various approaches to the Marks rule
taken by the several federal circuits and how each approach would treat the
Marks dispute that June Medical presents. Part III then considers further the
potential implications, immediate and remote, of the application of the
Marks rule to June Medical and of the conclusion that the Chief Justice’s concurrence has the strongest claim to precedential effect.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Ballad of Battling Standards: Abortion Jurisprudence Before June Medical
Unlike many of the landmark abortion cases in the United States, June
Medical did not really announce any new standard of review for evaluating
abortion restrictions—it was simply about application of precedent to a set of
facts. Yet the decision to apply or not to apply the benefits-burdens standard
of Whole Woman’s Health27 to Louisiana’s admitting privileges law was necessarily going to be a consequential one, seeing that Justice Breyer‘s view of the
Whole Woman’s Health standard is broader than some of the standards that
came before it, like the undue burden standard of Casey.28 Given that the
central disagreement between the plurality and concurrence in June Medical
is what exactly the proper standard of review for challenged abortion restrictions is, a brief overview of the relevant caselaw is in order.
1.

Roe v. Wade and Strict Scrutiny

Before the landmark Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade29 in 1973, state
legislatures were generally free to regulate abortion in whatever ways they saw
fit: abortion was either outlawed or significantly restricted in forty-six U.S.
25 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2134–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
26 Id. (“In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court concluded that Texas’s admitting privileges requirement ‘places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a
previability abortion’ and therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
27 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
28 See infra subsection I.A.2.
29 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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states.30 In a single move, the Supreme Court would “[sweep] aside all of
these laws and replace[ ] them with a new rule and regulatory framework of
its own making,”31 thus hatching the jurisprudential beast—often morphing,
never fully fledged—that was to grow into U.S. abortion law.
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade declared for the first time that abortion restrictions implicate an unenumerated, fundamental right to privacy
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 Such
reasoning would have seemed fantastic and shocking had not the path been
cleared for such jurisprudential innovation by a few prior decisions. It was
against a backdrop of Supreme Court cases that gradually situated certain
family matters within the protective reach of the right to privacy that the
Court decided that abortion ought to receive similar protection.33
The case most demonstrative of the sort of creative reasoning that
cleared the way for Roe is Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court found a
right to privacy in the “penumbras” created by the “emanations” of no fewer
than five Amendments in the Bill of Rights: the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth.34 The Griswold Court found that a law restricting the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional, as it violated this right to privacy.35 Eight
years later, the Roe Court held that the right to privacy also protected the
right to abortion—but the right was no longer penumbral (at least in the
context of abortion).36 Rather, the Court (unconfidently) found the right to
privacy buried in the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural guarantees.37
30 O. CARTER SNEAD, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN: THE CASE FOR THE BODY IN PUBLIC
BIOETHICS 110–11 (2020).
31 Id. at 111.
32 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy.”).
33 This right to privacy resists encroachment by the State. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (education and rearing of children); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (procreation); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 165–66 (1944) (family relationships); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965) (contraception) (noting that “[v]arious guarantees [explicit or implicit in the Bill
of Rights] create zones of privacy”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967) (interracial
marriage).
34 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the
Perils of Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 531 (2008) (calling
penumbral reasoning a “transparently fictional” process).
35 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
36 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37 “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Finding such a right required invocation of the doctrine of “substantive due process” which holds that the enumerated procedural rights of the Fourteenth Amendment implicate unenumerated substantive rights.
For a summary of the development of substantive due process in the twentieth century, see
generally Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63
(2006). For the Court’s unconfident language, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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By placing a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy within the
“fundamental right[ ]” of privacy, the Court ensured that the proper standard of judicial review for abortion restrictions would be “strict scrutiny”—
the highest and most stringent standard of review.38 Under a strict scrutiny
regime, a Court may only find justification for legislative regulation of a fundamental right if there is a “compelling state interest” in regulating that
right.39 Such regulation, moreover, must be “narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.”40 Most challenged laws do not survive
strict scrutiny.41
In the context of abortion, the Court in Roe contemplated that “[a]t
some point in pregnancy” the state attains interests (which become increasingly compelling throughout gestation) in “[maternal] health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential [human] life.”42
According to Roe’s (now inoperative) trimester framework, a state could not
regulate abortion before the end of the first trimester.43 After “approximately the end of the first trimester,” a state’s interest in maternal health
would be sufficiently “compelling” to justify regulating abortion in ways
related to maternal health.44 And after fetal viability, a state’s interest in
potential life would be sufficiently “compelling” to justify regulation and proscription of most abortions.45 This last directive has become known as Roe’s
“central holding”—i.e., that a state cannot ban “nontherapeutic” abortions
before fetal viability.46
The thread of Roe’s central holding weaved its way through the abortion
cases that percolated up to the Supreme Court in the 1970s and ’80s,47 but
there eventually came a point where the Court seemed to “retreat” from Roe’s
jurisprudentially extreme recognition of abortion as a fundamental right
38 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 155 (1973); SNEAD, supra note 30, at 115.
39 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969)).
40 Id.
41 SNEAD, supra note 30, at 115. Indeed, it is so difficult for a law to survive strict
scrutiny that Professor Gerald Gunther famously called the standard “‘strict’ in theory and
fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see Adam Winkler,
Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (finding that about thirty percent of challenged laws survive
strict scrutiny).
42 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 163.
43 Id. at 163.
44 Id. at 162–63.
45 See id. at 163–64.
46 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
47 See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 516 (1989); Simopoulos v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979); Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 520 (1977) (per curiam);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1976).
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without actually overruling the case.48 The Court’s apparent and increasing
discomfort with its practice of “impos[ing] . . . its own, extraconstitutional
value preferences”49 in abortion cases under Roe’s strict scrutiny regime
became so acute that Roe was destined for an overhaul.
2.

Casey and the Undue Burden Standard

Almost twenty years after Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court in Casey50 reaffirmed Roe’s “central holding”51 but shifted away from the “privacy” rationale
and downgraded the right to abortion from a fundamental right to a “protected liberty.”52 Thus, the Court had to fashion a lower standard of review
for challenged abortion regulations: the “undue burden” standard.53 The
Court held that an “undue burden” exists where a law places a “substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.”54 Any such law, the Court held, is unconstitutional. Conversely, a
law serving a “valid purpose” that does not impose a substantial obstacle is
constitutional even if it “has the incidental effect of making it more difficult
or more expensive to procure an abortion.”55
At issue in Casey were five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.56 The majority found that only one of these—the spousal
notification requirement—imposed an undue burden and was therefore
invalid.57 Justice Blackmun (who authored the majority opinion in Roe) dissented.58 He would have applied strict scrutiny and invalidated all five provi48 Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from
Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83, 83–84 (1989) (arguing that Webster “eviscerate[d] Roe
without explicitly overruling the case” by suggesting that “the abortion right [was] no
longer fundamental”).
49 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting).
50 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
51 The Casey Court announced that Roe’s central holding was “that viability marks the
earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a
legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.” Id. at 860 (plurality opinion).
52 Id. at 876.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 876, 878 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means
of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
55 Id. at 874.
56 Id. at 844. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1989) required informed consent of the
woman seeking an abortion; id. § 3206 (amended 1992) required informed consent of a
parent of a minor seeking an abortion (with the possibility of a judicial bypass); id. § 3209,
invalidated by Casey, 505 U.S. at 895, required a woman to notify her husband that she was
seeking an abortion; id. § 3203 excused compliance with the foregoing requirements in
the case of a “medical emergency”; and id. §§ 3207(b) (1988), 3214(a), and 3214(f)
imposed reporting requirements on abortion clinics.
57 Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–95.
58 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
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sions.59 Justice Blackmun’s alternative conclusion demonstrates just how vast
the difference between strict scrutiny and the undue burden standard is.
3.

Whole Woman’s Health and the Benefits-Burdens Test

Fast forward twenty-four years more, and a new standard emerges—or,
rather, an old standard evolves. At least it may seem so. In Whole Woman’s
Health, Justice Breyer—joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan—purported to apply Casey’s undue burden standard to invalidate
two Texas abortion laws, one requiring abortion providers to have admitting
privileges and one requiring abortion clinics to meet certain safety standards.60 But the majority’s decision came by way of a novel interpretation of
the undue burden standard: “The rule announced in Casey . . . requires that
courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with
the benefits those laws confer.”61
Yet any reasonable reading of Casey would not lead one to conclude the
undue burden standard necessarily requires this “grand ‘balancing test in
which unweighted factors mysteriously are weighed.’ ”62 And even if judges
could faithfully and fairly conduct such a balancing test, it flies in the face of
the very standard—i.e., the undue burden standard—that it purports to be
an elaboration of. For example, a law that poses no substantial obstacle on
abortion access, which would be otherwise valid under Casey, may violate the
benefits-burdens test if a court is unsatisfied with the benefits that flow from
the law as compared to the law’s burdens. The Court, then, seemed to apply
a standard somewhere in between the undue burden standard and strict
scrutiny.
A plausible explanation for the innovation is that the majority was
intending to augment the undue burden standard with a stricter test that
would be more difficult for abortion regulations to pass. Professor Jonathan
Siegel has described the mechanism of judicially crafted standard-shifting:
In some areas, as the law shifts from one legal rule to another, the new rule
does not immediately oust the old rule in a single, cataclysmic case. Rather,
the new rule first emerges as a supplement to the old rule. Only later does it
become clear that the new rule has supplanted the old rule.63

Also of note is Justice Breyer’s misstatement of the Casey standard. He wrote
that “viability”64 is the “relevant point at which a State may begin limiting
59 Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
60 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309, 2313, 2318 (2016);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031(a) (West 2015); 245.010(a) (West 2013),
invalidated by Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
61 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
62 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2135 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Marrs v. Motorola, Inc., 577 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2009)).
63 Jonathan R. Siegel, Injury in Fact and the Structure of Legal Revolutions, 68 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 207, 208 (2015).
64 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)).
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women’s access to abortion for reasons unrelated to maternal health.”65 But
the passage in Casey that he cited to support his reading stipulated that the
State may regulate abortion before viability in the name of certain state interests as long as those regulations do not impose an undue burden.66
Whether or not the Whole Woman’s Health majority was intending such a
jurisprudential sleight of hand, the plurality in June Medical, discussed below,
makes clear that the Justices who had signed onto Breyer’s opinion in Casey
thought they had indeed augmented the standard. From the standard-shifting perspective, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical takes on
a new light.
4.

June Medical and . . . Which Standard?

In June Medical, Justice Breyer—joined in plurality by Justices Ginsburg,
Kagan, and Sotomayor—along with Chief Justice Roberts (concurring) invalidated Louisiana’s admitting privileges law, Act 620.67 The plurality of the
Court sought to do so by applying the benefits-burdens standard of Whole
Woman’s Health. Recall that in Whole Woman’s Health the Court seemed to
scrutinize a challenged abortion law by weighing the law’s “asserted benefits
against the burdens” it imposed on access to abortion.68
Justice Breyer concluded in June Medical that the record supported the
district court’s finding that “the statute did not further the State’s asserted
interest in protecting women’s health” on the one hand and that the statute
placed an undue burden on access to abortion because of its anticipated
effect of forcing abortion clinics to close.69 According to Justice Breyer,
there was no real benefit, and the burden was clear.70 The scales tipped in
favor of invalidation. But Justice Breyer’s opinion was only a plurality opinion and by itself would not have been enough to invalidate Louisiana’s law.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts offered the necessary
fifth vote for invalidation—but he rejected Justice Breyer’s application of the
benefits-burdens standard. Chief Justice Roberts restated his view that Whole
65 Id.
66 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (speaking of
“the State’s profound interest in potential life” and “the health or safety of a woman seeking
an abortion” (emphasis added)). Put another way, Casey held:
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman’s exercise of the right to choose.
Id. at 877; see also SNEAD, supra note 30, at 161.
67 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2112, 2133. Note that by this time Justice Kavanaugh had
replaced Justice Kennedy, who signed onto the majority opinion in Casey. See supra note 57
and accompanying text.
68 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310.
69 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2112.
70 Id.
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Woman’s Health was wrongly decided,71 but, invoking stare decisis, he opted
to apply it to the similar facts of June Medical.72 The catch was that the Chief
Justice argued that the Court in Whole Woman’s Health clearly only intended
to apply the undue burden standard of Casey—not create a balancing test
meant to replace Casey’s standard.73 Since Louisiana’s admitting privileges
law “burden[ed] women seeking previability abortions to the same extent as
the Texas law [invalidated in Whole Woman’s Health],” stare decisis compelled
Chief Justice Roberts to concur in the judgment that the law is
unconstitutional.74
Crucially, the Chief Justice distinguished Whole Woman’s Health’s judgment from its rationale. He was able to concur with the plurality because the
facts of June Medical, on his view, were so similar to those in Whole Woman’s
Health that stare decisis recommended the same judgment here. With respect
to Whole Woman’s Health’s rationale, however, he differed from the plurality:
In this case, Casey’s requirement of finding a substantial obstacle before
invalidating an abortion regulation is therefore a sufficient basis for the decision, as it was in Whole Woman’s Health. In neither case, nor in Casey itself,
was there call for consideration of a regulation’s benefits, and nothing in
Casey commands such consideration. Under principles of stare decisis, I
agree with the plurality that the determination in Whole Woman’s Health that
Texas’s law imposed a substantial obstacle requires the same determination
about Louisiana’s law. Under those same principles, I would adhere to the
holding of Casey, requiring a substantial obstacle before striking down an
abortion regulation.75

The critical distinction between judgment and rationale resurfaces throughout the discussion of how Marks applies to June Medical below.
So how does Marks apply to June Medical? Where does June Medical leave
the state of abortion law? Does Whole Woman’s Health’s benefits-burdens standard, as applied by June Medical’s plurality, govern? Or has the Chief Justice
dialed the law back to Casey’s substantial obstacle/undue burden standard?
Indeed, did Whole Woman’s Health even modify Casey’s standard in the first
place? To pick back up the analogy to The Spanish Tragedy, the Court, like
Hieronimo, has perpetuated the semantic confusion regarding “narrowest”
71 Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Roberts
joined Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2330.
72 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The legal
doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special circumstances, to treat like cases alike.
The Louisiana law imposes a burden on access to abortion just as severe as that imposed by
the Texas law, for the same reasons. Therefore Louisiana’s law cannot stand under our
precedents.”).
73 Id. at 2138–39 (“We should respect the statement in Whole Woman’s Health that it
was applying the undue burden standard of Casey. . . . The Court explicitly stated that it was
applying ‘the standard, as described in Casey,’ and reversed the Court of Appeals for applying an approach that did ‘not match the standard that this Court laid out in Casey.’” (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10)).
74 Id. at 2141–42.
75 Id. at 2139.
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among lower courts, the players, in the face of supplications for clarity.76
The Court has initiated the drama, knowing that the lower courts are likely to
disagree with respect to which opinion is narrowest. Fortunately, the Marks
rule answers most of the stare decisis questions that June Medical leaves in its
wake. To see how, an overview of the history and application of the Marks
rule is necessary.
B. The Marks Rule and Narrowest Grounds
One of the foundational principles of the doctrine of stare decisis is that
a Supreme Court opinion generally does not assume precedential effect
unless a majority of the Justices endorses a single rule of decision.77 The
doctrine has few exceptions, and perhaps no exception seems more contrary
to the established modes of precedent generation than the Marks rule. The
Marks rule dictates that, in a split Supreme Court decision, the opinion representing the narrowest grounds for concurring in the judgment binds lower
courts on future questions of law.78 The unique nature of the Marks mechanism of precedent generation as well as the increasing frequency with which
courts apply the rule warrants an explanation of the rule’s history.79
Stanley Marks and his codefendants were charged with violating federal
obscenity laws. Between the time they committed the crimes and the commencement of their trial, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California,
which announced “guidelines to isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from
expression protected by the First Amendment.”80 Miller’s guidelines were far
less favorable to Marks and company than the older standard of Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, which exempted material that possessed “redeeming social
76 This is not to say that there are no good reasons for leaving questions like this one
unresolved for a time. One of the obvious benefits of the jurisdictional separation of the
several federal circuits is that each circuit is a sort of jurisprudential “laboratory.” The
several circuits, all laboring to solve the same problem with diverse approaches, may in this
way efficiently find workable answers to certain questions.
77 See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.03[2] (Daniel R. Coquillette, Gregory P. Joseph, Sol Schreiber, Georgene M. Vairo & Chilton Davis Varner eds., 3d
ed.), LEXIS (database updated 2020). On lower courts, the precedent set by Supreme
Court on questions of law is binding. See id. § 134.01[1]. The Supreme Court itself, however, adheres to precedent only as a matter of policy and has the power to overrule previous decisions. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (“[S]tare decisis is not
an inexorable command.” (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991))). For a
thorough overview of the doctrine of stare decisis, see generally Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411 (2010).
78 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
79 See Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1951–65 (2019)
(demonstrating increasing citations to Marks in opinions of the Supreme Court, federal
courts of appeals, and even state courts of appeals). One of the more curious features of
the Marks rule is that it has “jumped the federalism barrier.” Id. at 1944.
80 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973).
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value” from the obscenity laws.81 The question for the Supreme Court was
whether retroactive application of the Miller guidelines in Marks’s trial constituted a violation of any right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.82 The Court determined that the Memoirs standard was appropriate, but there was a problem: the majority in Memoirs split 3–2–1 on the
reasoning.
In Memoirs, Justice Brennan, joined by two other members, held that an
obscene book must have “redeeming social importance” in order to fall
within the protective reach of the First Amendment.83 Justice Black and Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment, but they reasoned that the First
Amendment protects all obscene materials from government interference.84
Justice Stewart also concurred, reasoning that only “hard-core pornography”85 may be suppressed.86 In holding that Justice Brennan’s Memoirs plurality was binding, the Court in Marks relied on previous interpretive practice
and announced its eponymous rule: “When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .’ ”87
C. The Critics and the Advocates
While most scholars of the Marks rule criticize it to varying degrees,88
there is a growing body of literature defending the rule.89 The major criti81 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418–19 (1966) (plurality opinion).
82 Marks, 430 U.S. at 189–93.
83 Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421.
84 Id. at 421 (noting that Justice Black concurred in Memoirs for the reasons stated in
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting), and Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)); id. at 426–27 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 481 (Black, J., dissenting).
85 Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 518 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting what could be suppressed).
86 Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that Justice Stewart concurred in Memoirs for the reasons stated in Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 497 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 518 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
87 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(plurality opinion)). For a more thorough description of Marks’s background, see Ryan C.
Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV.
795, 804–06 (2017).
88 See, e.g., Re, supra note 78, at 1945 (“[T]he Marks rule is wrong, root and stem, and
should be abandoned.”); Douglas J. Whaley, Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of NoClear-Majority Judicial Decisions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 370, 376 (1968) (arguing that the opinion
which enjoys the support of the most nondissenting judges should become the court’s
official opinion); Williams, supra note 86, at 838–59 (arguing for a “shared agreement”
approach to plurality precedent).
89 See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2,
Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) (No. 17-155), 2018 WL 637338, at *2
(arguing that abandoning Marks would “create considerable guidance problems for lower
courts” and would “undermine norms within [the Supreme Court] that motivate the suc-
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ques of the rule generally fall into three categories. First, it would seem that
the Marks rule—in its generation of precedent in the absence of a clear
majority—is likely to create “precedents that are unlikely to be either legally
correct or practically desirable.”90 It is easy to see why. It would seem that a
rule endorsed by, say, four Justices is more likely to be legally correct than a
single-Justice concurrence (to say nothing of the obvious inconsistency
between allowing a single Justice to determine policy and the “majority-rules”
democratic mentality woven into America’s constitution).91
Second, some have noted that the Marks rule promotes inefficiencies in
judicial deliberation and results in institutional instability.92 If, as an alternative to the Marks rule, only rules of decision which enjoyed the endorsement
of five or more Justices assumed precedential effect, Justices would have the
incentive to negotiate and settle on a position that appeals to all members in
the majority. The Marks rule, however, allows for as few as one Justice to set
precedent so long as he can cast his reasoning as the narrowest among the
judgment-supportive opinions in a decision. Thus, Justices supporting the
judgment in a decision may have little incentive to find an optimal point
along the spectrum of potential reasons for a decision where all members in
the majority can agree.93 On this view, Marks is a bane of judicial economy.
The third critique is that the Marks rule creates confusion among lower
courts.94 How is a judge supposed to figure out which opinion in an onpoint case is narrowest? While the Supreme Court could resolve the interpretive issues by endorsing one of the various “versions”95 of the Marks rule
or providing other guidance, it has not done so.96 Often, courts—including
the Supreme Court—end up designating one opinion as narrowest without
explaining how they came to that conclusion.97 The temptation for judges
cessful formation of majority opinions”); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v.
United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 329 (2000).
90 Re, supra note 78, at 1946.
91 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1431 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I am
aware of no case holding that the Marks rule is inapplicable when the narrowest ground is
supported by only one Justice. Certainly the lower courts have understood Marksto [sic]
apply in that situation.”); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975, 981 (3d Cir. 1989)
(“Although there is some awkwardness in attributing precedential value to an opinion of
one Supreme Court justice to which no other justice adhered, it is the usual practice when
that is the determinative opinion . . . .”).
92 See, e.g., Re, supra note 78, at 1969.
93 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447, 486, 493 (2020) (discussing the assumption implicit in Marks that Justices often
settle on views that can be arranged on a spectrum).
94 See, e.g., Re, supra note 78, at 1944–45.
95 See infra Section II.A (explaining the various approaches to Marks application).
96 See Williams, supra note 86, at 819–22 (noting the Supreme Court’s apparent “indifference” to the practical problems of Marks); supra note 12 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (according precedential
effect to Justice Powell’s concurrence in an on-point case because, under Marks, it was
simply “more limited” than the plurality’s opinion in that case); Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d
912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020) (invoking Marks and simply noting that “Chief Justice Robert’s
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deciding Marks-implicated cases to designate as narrowest that opinion which
they would prefer to apply as precedent is clear. But even in the absence of
agreement on how exactly the Marks rule ought to work, most circuits have
developed their own methods of determining which opinion is narrowest.
While the Marks rule in its current form potentially allows for overmuch judicial discretion in precedent application, it is not a blank check.
II. THE MARKS RULE(S)

AND

JUNE MEDICAL

A. Six Paths to Narrowest
A noteworthy feature of abortion jurisprudence is that June Medical is not
the first Marks-implicated abortion case. Parts of Casey’s joint opinion commanded the votes of only a plurality of the Court, but the joint opinion, representing the narrowest position supporting the judgment, is the holding
under Marks. The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much.
A Marks dispute erupted after the Supreme Court remanded Casey for
proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.98 On remand, the Marks
dispute prompted a number of complex procedural moves by the parties.
Attempting to put to rest the continued disagreement between the parties on
the implications of Casey, Justice Souter invoked Marks in an in-chambers
opinion, with an interesting caveat, to instruct the parties and courts below
on how to read Casey: “For the purposes of this opinion, I join the applicants
and the courts below in treating the joint opinion in [Casey] as controlling, as
the statement of the Members of the Court who concurred in the judgment
on the narrowest grounds.”99
The Supreme Court’s swift clarification that the joint opinion was controlling under Marks prevented future Marks disputes over Casey and spared
lower courts the burden of applying Marks under their various approaches.
It would seem, however, that Casey presented a fairly easy Marks issue anyway:
the joint opinion was obviously narrowest under any reasonable reading of
Marks, and there was really no question about a single Justice’s concurrence
potentially competing for precedential effect. June Medical is a harder case.
For one, the Court has not explicitly indicated which opinion it views as controlling. Additionally, the question of precedential effect is between a singleJustice concurrence, which would arguably overrule prior precedent
(although it does not claim to do so), and a four-Justice plurality, which purports to adhere to prior precedent.
In the absence of guidance from on high, most of the federal circuit
courts of appeals have developed their own working definition of “narrowest”
[sic] vote [in June Medical] was necessary in holding unconstitutional Louisiana’s admitting-privileges law, so his separate opinion is controlling”).
98 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1309–10 (1994) (Souter, J., in chambers).
99 Casey, 510 U.S. at 1310 n.2 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist—who dissented in Casey—also later wrote that he viewed the Casey plurality as binding under Marks.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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for Marks purposes.100 Thus, the approach a court takes to Marks application varies by circuit. Indeed, the approach may even vary within a circuit.
Sometimes the difference between one approach to Marks and another is
more semantic than substantive, and some circuits have applied different
approaches to Marks at different times.101 Because all approaches to Marks
have core similarities, all approaches would produce the same result in many
cases. June Medical is most likely one of these cases. Because each Marks
approach analyzes in different ways how each opinion fits with the others,
Table 1 lays out each opinion in June Medical as well as its respective author
and signing Justices for convenience.
TABLE 1
Majority
Breyer, J.
joined by:
Ginsburg, J.
Kagan, J.
Sotomayor, J

Roberts, C.J. Thomas, J.

Dissent
Alito, J.
joined by:
Gorsuch, J.
Thomas, J. (in part)
Kavanaugh, J. (in
part)

Gorsuch, J.

Kavanaugh, J.

1. The Logical-Subset/Reasoning-Based Approach
The “logical-subset” approach is likely the most prevalent, consistently
applied by the Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, among
others.102 Under this approach, a Supreme Court decision only becomes
binding on lower courts if a single line of reasoning enjoys the assent of a majority of the Justices.103 A single line of reasoning exists if there is an opinion
which is a “logical subset” of other, broader opinions. Put another way, if
there is a lowest common denominator in terms of rationale among a majority of Justices, that rationale is narrowest and becomes binding on lower
courts. If no single line of reasoning is endorsed by a majority of the Court,
only the specific result—the judgment—becomes binding on lower courts.
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit recently adopted this approach with
forceful language:
To foster clarity, we explicitly adopt the reasoning-based approach . . . .
This approach . . . makes the most sense. A fractured Supreme Court decision should only bind the federal courts of appeal when a majority of the
Justices agree upon a single underlying rationale and one opinion can reasonably be described as a logical subset of the other. When no single ratio100 For thorough overviews and critiques of each approach, see Re, supra note 78, at
1976–93, and Williams, supra note 86, at 806–19.
101 See infra subsections II.A.1–6.
102 See 18 MOORE, supra note 76, at ¶ 134.03[2]; EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 431 (6th Cir. 2020).
103 See Re, supra note 78, at 1980–81.
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nale commands a majority of the Court, only the specific result is binding on
lower federal courts.104

For example, if a three-Justice plurality endorses the judgment based on
rationales A and B, and a two-Justice concurrence endorses the judgment
based on rationales C and D, neither opinion could be said to represent a
“logical subset” of the other. There is no common denominator. If, on the
other hand, the same two-Justice concurrence endorsed the judgment based
on rationale A, the reasoning of the concurrence would obviously be a logical subset of the reasoning in the plurality (which applied rationales A and
B). Thus, the concurring opinion—and therefore the A prong of the reasoning—is narrowest for Marks purposes and becomes binding on lower courts.
This approach is often schematized as two concentric circles. The smaller
circle, representing the “narrower” opinion, is nested within the larger circle,
representing the broader opinion.105
Applied to June Medical, the logical-subset approach almost certainly
demands that the Chief Justice’s concurrence bind. Justice Breyer clearly
views the relevant standard as undue burden-plus. In his view, Casey’s substantial-obstacle test as applied in Whole Woman’s Health requires also a consideration of the law’s benefits.106 Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand,
views the standard simply as the undue burden standard as articulated in
Casey and reaffirmed in Whole Woman’s Health.107 Thus, the Chief Justice’s
view of the standard of review necessary to reach the judgment (undue burden alone) is logically nested within the plurality’s broader conceptualization
of the standard (undue burden plus consideration of the law’s benefits).
While the plurality looked to both the burdens and benefits of Act 620, the
concurrence looked only to the burdens.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit recently applied the logical-subset approach to
June Medical in EMW Women’s Surgical Center, PSC v. Friedlander and found
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence to be binding.108 Applying a hybrid of
104 United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Consider
also the D.C. Circuit’s enunciation of the approach: “In essence, the narrowest opinion
must represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment.” King v.
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
105 For a visualization, see Re, supra note 78, at 1981 fig.4, and Williams, supra note 86,
at 809 fig.1.
106 See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2122–32 (2020) (plurality)
(assessing Act 620’s burdens and, subsequently, its benefits).
107 Id. at 2139.
108 978 F.3d 418, 431–33 (6th Cir. 2020); see Bristol Reg’l Women’s Ctr., P.C. v. Slatery,
No. 20-6267, 2021 WL 650893, at *14 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) (Thapar, J., dissenting)
(“[A]s our court recently held, the Chief Justice’s separate opinion in June Medical—not
the plurality opinion—provides the controlling legal rule in the case.” (citing EMW
Women’s Surgical Ctr., 978 F.3d at 433)). But see id. at *5–6 (majority opinion) (expressing
doubt as to the precedential effect of EMW and labeling Judge Larsen’s analysis as potentially dicta).
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the logical-subset and results-based approaches,109 a divided panel found
that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence was binding under Marks and
vacated an injunction against enforcement of a Kentucky law that did not
conclusively place an undue burden on women seeking abortions.110
Writing for the majority, Judge Larsen articulated her Marks analysis in
the following fashion:
In a fractured decision where two opinions concur in the judgment, an
opinion will be the narrowest under Marks if the instances in which it would
reach the same result in future cases form “a logical subset” of the instances
in which the other opinion would reach the same result. This is so because
in that subset of cases, a majority of the Court which issued the fractured
decision would necessarily agree with the result. In a fractured decision
upholding the constitutionality of a law, that means the narrowest opinion is
the one whose rationale would uphold the fewest laws going forward. . . .
Conversely, when a fractured decision strikes down a law as unconstitutional, the narrowest opinion is the one whose rationale would invalidate the
fewest laws going forward.111

Both the plurality and the concurrence in June Medical would invalidate any
law that places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a
previability abortion.112 But the plurality would also invalidate laws where
“the balance” between the law’s burdens and benefits “tipped against the statute’s constitutionality.”113 Judge Larsen concluded: “Because all laws invalid
under the Chief Justice’s rationale are invalid under the plurality’s, but not
all laws invalid under the plurality’s rationale are invalid under the Chief
Justice’s, the Chief Justice’s position is the narrowest under Marks.”114
2. The Median Approach
Also known as the “fifth-vote” approach, the median approach views as
binding that opinion which represents the rationale of the “median” Justice.115 To locate the narrowest grounds, a lower court looks to the “swing”
vote—or the Justice (or bloc of Justices) who was necessary to provide the
fifth judgment-supportive vote. A swing vote is identified as narrowest if its
109 See infra subsection II.A.4 for more about the results-based approach.
110 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 978 F.3d at 422–23, 431–34.
111 Id. at 431–32 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558, 562
(6th Cir. 2009)).
112 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2120, 2122 (plurality opinion); id. at 2138 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
113 Id. at 2120 (plurality opinion).
114 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 978 F.3d at 433. But see Whole Woman’s Health All. v.
Hill, No. 1:18-CV-01904, 2020 WL 5994460, at *28 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 9, 2020) (“Because the
plurality and concurring opinions applied differing undue burden tests and neither can be
considered a logical subset of the other (indeed, the opinions are in direct controversy
with one another on this point), we reject the State’s argument that the plurality and the
concurrence in June Medical encompassed a common holding regarding the proper application by the lower courts of the undue burden standard.”).
115 See Re, supra note 78, at 1977; Williams, supra note 86, at 813.
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judgment-supportive conditions will have narrower application than those of
the other opinion(s) in future cases. That is, the conditions upon which the
swing vote premised its judgment are less often satisfied than those of the
other majority opinion(s).116 A lower court’s rationale for this approach is
largely “predictive” in nature: in future, factually similar cases, the Court will
likely be able to muster five votes only for the rationale taken by the “fifth
Justice” in the earlier case.117 That is, the necessary fifth Justice likely would
not join the majority in a later case unless it followed his or her rationale.
Alternatively, the approach’s rationale is premised on the view that if the
majority had to settle on one view, they would likely settle on the median
Justice’s view.118 The Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have applied, or at
least flirted with, this approach.119 For example, if a four-Justice plurality
would endorse propositions A and B, but the concurring Justice would
endorse only proposition A, the four-Justice bloc would be more likely to
cede its adherence to proposition B than the single Justice would be to adopt
proposition B. In order to retain the single Justice’s vote and thus the majority, it is assumed that the four Justices would accept the single Justice’s narrower view.
The paradigmatic case to which the median approach applies is the
4–1–4 case—like June Medical. In such a case, there is a spectrum of views in
which the four Justices in the plurality and the four dissenting Justices
represent two extremes, where the single concurring Justice has staked out a
middle ground. It seems clear that the Chief Justice had done just that.
Where the plurality would apply the higher benefits-burdens standard of
Whole Woman’s Health and the dissenters—though expressing a range of
views—generally agreed that Casey’s undue burden standard should not
result in Act 620’s invalidation,120 the Chief Justice’s concurrence, invoking
stare decisis, applied the undue burden standard of Casey but upheld the
116 See Re, supra note 78, at 1977. For a visualization of the median approach as a Venn
diagram, see id. at 1977 fig.3.
117 Williams, supra note 86, at 814.
118 Id.
119 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (“[W]henever possible, there [must] be a single
legal standard for the lower courts to apply in similar cases and that this standard, when
properly applied, [must] produce results with which a majority of the Justices in the case
articulating the standard would agree.”); United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 610 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In most cases,
the commonsense way to apply Marks is to identify and follow the opinion that occupies
the middle ground between (i) the broader opinion supporting the judgment and (ii) the
dissenting opinion.”); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir.
2009) (“Because the other Justices [in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425
(2002),] divided 4 to 4, and Justice Kennedy was in the middle, his views establish the
holding.”).
120 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2148 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2154–57 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2181 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2182
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Alito’s dissent in its discussion of Casey).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL416.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 19

JUNE MEDICAL AND THE MARKS RULE

5-APR-21

15:15

1743

law.121 Thus, the Chief Justice was caught in the middle. Like the plurality,
he viewed the Casey standard as applied in Whole Woman’s Health as resolving
the case; like the dissenters, he believed that Whole Woman’s Health’s “balancing test” was inapplicable (though for different reasons).122
The condition (substantial obstacle/undue burden) upon whose satisfaction the concurrence entered judgment in June Medical will apply more
narrowly than the plurality’s condition (undue burden and weighing of benefits) in future cases, so it represented the “median” view. In other words,
since the concurrence’s undue burden standard is more easily met than the
plurality’s standard, the Chief Justice can be safely categorized as the swing
vote. The Chief Justice’s condition, requiring a substantial obstacle amounting to an undue burden, will apply more narrowly because it will be satisfied
less often than the plurality’s condition—requiring a “balance” between benefits and burdens that tips in favor of unconstitutionality.123
3. The Case-Specific Approach
The case-specific approach asks which judgment-supportive opinion
employed the most case-specific reasoning to resolve the case. Essentially,
the most fact-bound reasoning among the judgment-supportive opinions represents the narrowest grounds supporting the judgment.124 Notably, this
approach to Marks—since it only asks whether one opinion employed more
case-specific reasoning—does not require there to be any overlap between
opinions with respect to reason. Thus, where the logical-subset approach
would decline to find a narrowest opinion in a split decision where there is
no common denominator among the majority opinions, the case-specific
approach will recognize the opinion of even a single Justice to be “narrowest”
under Marks if it applied the most fact-bound reasoning. In fact, divergence
between the logical-subset approach and the case-specific approach led to a
recent circuit split over how Marks applies to Freeman v. United States,125 a
4–1–4 sentencing case.126 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hughes
121 Id. at 2134–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
122 Interestingly, Justice Alito framed the Chief Justice’s concurrence not in Marks
terms, but in terms of the Chief Justice’s “vote[ ] to overrule Whole Woman’s Health insofar
as it changed the Casey test.” June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting). If he was
right, then there were five votes to “overrule” Whole Woman’s Health (Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh). But Chief Justice Roberts did not
purport to “overrule” Whole Woman’s Health; he seemed to think that Whole Woman’s Health
did not actually change Casey’s standard. Rather, he thought that Whole Woman’s Health’s
discussion of benefits must be read in the context of Casey and that Whole Woman’s Health
on its own terms did not change Casey’s undue burden standard. See id. at 2135–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
123 Id. at 2120 (plurality opinion).
124 United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2012).
125 564 U.S. 522 (2011).
126 Compare United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(finding that no opinion in Freeman controlled because Justice Sotomayor’s lone concurrence was not a “logical subset” of the plurality opinion), with Dixon, 687 F.3d at 359 (hold-
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v. United States to address the split but resolved the case on substantive
grounds and ultimately left the Marks question untouched.127
One of the cases that created the circuit split was United States v. Dixon, in
which the Seventh Circuit found that Justice Sotomayor’s lone concurrence—rather than the four-Justice plurality—in Freeman was binding under
Marks because her reasoning provided the narrowest, most case-specific basis
for deciding the case.128 Strikingly, the court in Dixon acknowledged that
“eight Justices disagreed with Justice Sotomayor’s approach and believed it
would produce arbitrary and unworkable results.”129 Nevertheless, the court
found that her reasoning was narrowest and thus controlling.130
The case-specific approach likely has little to say about June Medical
because the reasoning of both the plurality and the concurrence was similarly
fact-bound, and the Chief Justice’s concurrence clearly seems to instead
invite a logical subset (or similar) analysis. If the approach were to apply at
all, it would most likely recommend treating the Chief Justice’s concurrence
as binding. The real divergence between the plurality and concurrence
seems to be a question of the qualities of Casey’s undue burden standard as
applied by Whole Woman’s Health. From the Chief Justice’s perspective, the
plurality’s consideration of Act 620’s benefits131 was extraneous to the
proper undue burden analysis, which was sufficient, without consideration of
benefits, to reach the judgment. On such a view, the plurality’s consideration
of benefits was unnecessary to resolve the case,132 and under the case-specific
approach, such consideration would make the plurality opinion broader
than the concurrence. If the Chief Justice is right, then his concurrence is
narrowest in that it is most case-specific in its consideration only of Act 620’s
burdens in reaching the judgment.
ing that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence was narrowest and controlling because “her
reasoning provided the narrowest, most case-specific basis for deciding Freeman”). Curiously, the Fourth Circuit applied the logical-subset approach to the same question, but,
unlike the Ninth Circuit, determined that Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion did
“embod[y] [the narrowest] position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support[ed] the judgment.” United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011)
(quoting A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Massanari, 305 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2002)) (applying
Marks).
127 Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 (2018).
128 Dixon, 687 F.3d at 358–59.
129 Id. at 359.
130 Id. at 359–60; see also Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 433 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding
that Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989),
which invalidated a state tax exemption for religious publications, was narrowest because
his Establishment Clause reasoning was limited to the sale of religious literature by religious organizations and did not employ the broader statements and reasoning present in
the plurality).
131 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2130–32 (2020) (plurality
opinion).
132 Id. at 2139 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“In this case, Casey’s
requirement of finding a substantial obstacle before invalidating an abortion regulation is
therefore a sufficient basis for the decision, as it was in Whole Woman’s Health.”).
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4. The Results-Based Approach
Under the results-based approach—which has been used by the Third,
Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits—the narrowest grounds are “those that,
in other cases, would consistently produce results that would be reached by
the majority of the Justices supporting the fragmented decision.”133 This language suggests that the results-based approach may simply be the logical subset or median approach doing business under a different name. Just as the
logical-subset approach effectively asks whether a lowest common denominator exists between the opinions comprising the majority, the results-based
approach seeks out the “least ‘far-reaching’ ” common ground among the
opinions.134
Consider again the Freeman circuit split. In determining whether the
plurality or Justice Sotomayor’s lone concurrence was narrowest under
Marks, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
embodied the holding under Marks since whenever the standard she applied
would permit a sentence reduction, the plurality’s standard would as well
(but the converse is not true).135 In a word, Justice Sotomayor’s approach
would produce consistent results, whereas the plurality’s approach would not.
As applied to June Medical, the results-based approach would likely marshal the same rationale that Judge Larsen of the Sixth Circuit employed in
her logical-subset analysis: “Because all laws invalid under the Chief Justice’s
rationale are invalid under the plurality’s, but not all laws invalid under the
plurality’s rationale are invalid under the Chief Justice’s, the Chief Justice’s
position is the narrowest under Marks.”136 The Chief Justice’s concurrence,
then, would bind under this approach as well.
5. The Smallest-Change Approach
The smallest-change approach asks which opinion in a fractured majority would change settled law the least. A straightforward example is the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,137 a personal
jurisdiction case which produced a four-Justice plurality and a two-Justice
concurrence written by Justice Breyer. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Justice Breyer’s approach in his concurrence was “narrowest” under Marks
because he looked only to precedent in deciding the case, whereas the plurality would have altered the stream-of-commerce test for assessing personal
jurisdiction.138
133 See 18 MOORE, supra note 76, at ¶ 134.03[2].
134 United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v.
Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001)).
135 United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1011–15 (11th Cir. 2017).
136 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., PSC v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 433 (6th Cir. 2020).
137 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
138 Ainsworth v. Moffet Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 2013); see also AFTGTG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he crux of
Justice Breyer’s concurrence was that the Supreme Court’s framework applying the stream-
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The June Medical majority opinions defy such a straightforward application of the smallest-change approach because both the plurality and the concurrence purport to simply apply precedent; neither Justice Breyer nor Chief
Justice Roberts views his opinion as changing the law.139 Their disagreement
is about what the law is. As noted above, Justice Breyer views Whole Woman’s
Health as requiring a balancing of benefits and burdens of a restriction,
whereas the Chief Justice argues that Whole Woman’s Health, on its own terms,
requires no such balancing. Any consideration of benefits under Casey and
Whole Woman’s Health, the Chief Justice argues, must be confined to the
“threshold requirement that the State have a ‘legitimate purpose’ and that
the law be ‘reasonably related to that goal.’ ”140
True, Whole Woman’s Health’s requirement of a benefits-burdens balancing test was the “law” insofar as lower courts after Whole Woman’s Health generally assumed that such a test was the law and, as such, applied it to
challenged abortion regulations.141 Justice Alito’s remark in his June Medical
dissent that the Chief Justice was “vot[ing] to overrule Whole Woman’s Health
insofar as it changed the Casey test” further suggests that—at least in effect—
the Chief Justice’s concurrence would in fact “change” the law if found to be
binding, at least to the extent that it would require lower courts to abandon
the benefits-burdens balancing test that they have heretofore been
applying.142
The relevant distinction here would be that what the law is is not necessarily how the law has been interpreted; incorrect application of law does not
change the law’s nature. On such a view, if the Chief Justice accurately
described the state of the law after Whole Woman’s Health, then his concurrence would be binding under the smallest-change approach because he
applied Whole Woman’s Health on its own terms, whereas the plurality’s
approach, if found to be binding, would perpetuate incorrect application of
Whole Woman’s Health (thus also perpetuating the “change” from Casey that
results from incorrect application of Whole Woman’s Health).
6. The Issue-by-Issue (or All-Opinions) Approach
Also known as the all-opinions approach,143 the issue-by-issue approach
is more of an independent approach to finding what binds in a Supreme
Court opinion than a species of Marks application, but it is certainly Marksof-commerce theory . . . had not changed . . . . The narrowest holding is that which can be
distilled from Justice Breyer’s concurrence—that the law remains the same after
McIntyre.”).
139 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2120 (2020) (plurality opinion);
id. at 2133–34 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
140 Id. at 2138 (first quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882
(1992) (joint opinion); then quoting id. at 878 (plurality opinion)).
141 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Adams, 937 F.3d 973, 983 (7th
Cir. 2019) (applying the benefits-burdens balancing test).
142 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting).
143 See Re, supra note 78, at 1988–93; Williams, supra note 86, at 817.
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adjacent. What matters is not what opinion is “narrowest,” but which propositions get at least five affirmative votes. This approach involves consideration of each opinion in a case—including the dissent(s)—in order to
determine each proposition that enjoys the endorsement of five or more Justices.144 It may seem anomalous that a proposition, some of whose necessary
votes come from dissenters, should bind in future cases, but the approach
has been taken before.145 Some circuits, however, seem to have expressly
disavowed the approach.146 The argument for using this approach is strongest when a court is unable to find a narrowest opinion under a Marks
analysis.147
In June Medical, there are two operative issues. The first is whether,
under stare decisis considerations, the facts of the case compel a judgment
that is identical to that in the factually similar case of Whole Woman’s Health.
The second is whether the standard for abortion regulations is the undue
burden standard of Casey rather than the benefits-burdens standard of Whole
Woman’s Health. Both issues have five affirmative votes, but the only affirmative vote in common between the two issues is that of the Chief Justice. Chief
Justice Roberts agreed with the plurality that stare decisis compelled the
judgment in this case and supplied the necessary fifth vote here.148
The second issue is more complex. As Justice Alito suggests, there are
five votes in favor of applying the undue burden standard of Casey rather
than the benefits-burdens standard of Whole Woman’s Health.149 The waters
are muddied by the fact that the Chief Justice does not purport to overrule
Whole Woman’s Health, but rather to clarify that it did not change the Casey
144 See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have
looked to the votes of dissenting Justices if they, combined with votes from plurality or
concurring opinions, establish a majority view on the relevant issue.”); see also Williams,
supra note 86, at 817–19. For a visualization of this approach, see Re, supra note 78, at
1989.
145 See, e.g., Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658–59 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that lower courts are bound to follow a 5–4 vote on a takings issue in a Supreme Court
case, even though four of those votes were cast by dissenters).
146 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 972 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“[A]ny intimation that the views of dissenting Justices can be cobbled together with those
of a concurring Justice to create a binding holding must be rejected. That is not the law in
this or virtually any court following common-law principles of judgments.”); United States
v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1012 (11th Cir. 2017) (“When determining which opinion controls, we do not ‘consider the positions of those who dissented.’” (quoting United States v.
Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007))).
147 When Justice Kavanaugh was on the D.C. Circuit, he called this approach a “necessary logical corollary” of Marks when a Marks analysis does not find a “narrowest” opinion.
United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
the denial of rehearing en banc).
148 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133–34 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
149 Id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the Chief Justice “votes to overrule Whole
Woman’s Health insofar as it changed the Casey test.”).
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standard.150 Thus distinguished, it seems there are four votes to apply the
benefits-burdens standard (the plurality), one vote to apply the undue burden standard as applied in Casey and Whole Woman’s Health (the concurrence), and four votes to overrule Whole Woman’s Health “insofar as it
changed the Casey test.”151 But despite the Chief Justice’s apparent solicitude in not using the word “overrule,” his concurrence and Justice Alito’s
dissent are functionally in agreement that the undue burden standard of
Casey is the proper standard and should be applied. Thus, as Justice Kavanaugh notes in his dissent, there are five votes—one from the Chief Justice
and four from the dissenters—“reject[ing] the Whole Woman’s Health costbenefit standard.”152
B. Discussion
Although most of the time courts will reach similar results, notwithstanding their slightly different and sometimes shifting iterations of the Marks
rule, it is easy for one to see how a single fractured Supreme Court decision
could command conflicting interpretations among the federal circuit courts
of appeals. For example, a lone concurrence could represent the “smallest
change” in the law—as Justice Breyer’s concurrence in McIntyre does—but a
four-Justice plurality could be characterized by another court as a logical subset of that concurrence’s broader rationale. Thus, one circuit may find that
the concurrence is binding; another, the plurality opinion. One would logically conclude that it may be more accurate to speak of the Marks rules.
As noted above, the diversity in application of the Marks rule has already
produced a circuit split on the question of whether Justice Breyer’s plurality
or Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical is narrowest. The
Eighth Circuit in Hopkins v. Jegley found that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence was binding but curiously did not explain how it reached that conclusion,153 and the Sixth Circuit found the same applying the logical-subset
approach.154
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, along with a few federal district
courts, has also applied the logical-subset approach, but found that neither

150 Id. at 2134, 2135–38 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
151 Id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
153 Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Chief Justice Robert’s [sic]
vote was necessary in holding unconstitutional Louisiana’s admitting-privileges law, so his
separate opinion is controlling. . . . In light of Chief Justice Roberts’s separate opinion,
‘five Members of the Court reject[ed] the Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit standard.’”
(quoting June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (alteration in original))).
The language suggests the court was applying the “fifth-vote” approach and corroborating
its conclusion with the issue-by-issue approach.
154 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., PSC v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 431 (6th Cir. 2020).
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opinion represented a logical subset of the other and that Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt’s cost-benefit test still governed.155
It has been established, at least provisionally, that Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence should become binding on lower courts under any application
of Marks, and two circuits have endorsed this view. There are, however, two
potential hurdles that may seem to block such a result, but these are easily
cleared. The first is that Chief Justice Roberts wrote only for himself, and it
seems unwise for courts to afford precedential effect to a single-Justice opinion rather than a four-Justice opinion. But it is settled that Marks applies to
the opinion representing the narrowest reasoning supporting the judgment—no matter how the Court split.156
The second hurdle is taller, but still surmountable. A single Justice’s
opinion may be controlling under Marks, but what if that opinion overrules
prior precedent? Indeed, a three-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court in
Ramos v. Louisiana expressed disapproval of an interpretation of the Marks
rule that would allow a single Justice to overrule precedent: “[W]e would
have to embrace a new and dubious proposition: that a single Justice writing
only for himself has the authority to bind this Court to propositions it has
already rejected. . . . [N]o case has before suggested that a single Justice may
overrule precedent.”157 Thus, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence simply
cannot control under Marks. Two responses to this argument.
First, Chief Justice Roberts arguably was simply applying precedent. At
least, that is what he purports to be doing. Invoking the doctrine of stare
decisis and marshaling the support of Blackstone, Burke, and Hamilton,
Chief Justice Roberts argues that stare decisis counsels in favor of applying
Whole Woman’s Health and invalidating Act 620.158 He argues, moreover, that
Whole Woman’s Health did not actually transform Casey’s undue burden standard into the benefits-burdens standard:
We should respect the statement in Whole Woman’s Health that it was
applying the undue burden standard of Casey. The opinion in Whole
Woman’s Health began by saying, “We must here decide whether two provisions of [the Texas law] violate the Federal Constitution as interpreted in
Casey.” Nothing more. The Court explicitly stated that it was applying “the
standard, as described in Casey,” and reversed the Court of Appeals for
applying an approach that did “not match the standard that this Court laid
out in Casey.”159
155 Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 972 F.3d 649, 652–53 (5th Cir. 2020) (“In June
Medical, the only common denominator between the plurality and the concurrence is their
shared conclusion that the challenged Louisiana law constituted an undue burden. . . .
The decision does not furnish a new controlling rule as to how to perform the undueburden test. Therefore, Hellerstedt’s formulation of the test continues to govern this
case.”).
156 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
157 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1402–03 (2020) (plurality opinion).
158 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2133–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
159 Id. at 2138–39 (internal citations omitted).
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Chief Justice Roberts further contends that, while Casey did discuss the benefits of the regulations, the Court did not place them “on a scale opposite the
law’s burdens. Rather, Casey discussed benefits in considering the threshold
requirement that the State have a ‘legitimate purpose’ and that the law be
‘reasonably related to that goal.’ ”160 Chief Justice Roberts, on his own terms,
was merely interpreting Whole Woman’s Health—not attempting to overrule it.
As Judge Larsen argued in Friedlander, “if Casey’s joint opinion did not implicitly overrule Roe, neither did the Chief Justice’s opinion implicitly overrule
Whole Woman’s Health.”161
The second response to the argument that Roberts’s opinion cannot
control under Marks is that, even if Roberts’s opinion would overrule prior
precedent (i.e., Whole Woman’s Health’s benefits-burdens standard), Marks
still demands that his opinion bind. Although a three-Justice plurality in
Ramos suggested in dicta that the notion that a single Justice can overrule
prior precedent under special circumstances is a “dubious proposition,”162
three dissenting Justices explicitly argued that such a notion is consistent
with, indeed required by, “the logic of Marks.”163 The dissenters, moreover,
noted that they were unaware of any case holding otherwise.164 For now at
least, the question of whether a single Justice may overrule prior precedent is
an “academic” one,165 neither explicitly endorsed nor rejected by the
Supreme Court.
Unless and until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, lower courts have
little choice but to take Marks on its own terms. Marks requires lower courts
to find a “single legal standard” from a split decision,166 and that standard
must be that of the “narrowest” opinion.167 Since the term “narrowest” is
currently as capacious as it is underdetermined, lower courts have had no
choice but to impose reasonable interpretations upon it, as seen above. But
any notion that there are hidden principles in Marks—for example, that the
narrowest opinion binds unless it overrules prior precedent—which are not
direct outgrowths of the doctrine’s logic is more dubious than the presumption that there are no such hidden principles.
III. IMPLICATIONS: JUNE MEDICAL

AND

BEYOND

Because the Marks rule in each of its forms most plausibly recommends
according precedential effect to the Chief Justice’s concurrence, his opinion
160 Id. at 2138 (first quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882
(1992) (joint opinion); then quoting id. at 878 (plurality opinion)).
161 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., PSC v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 437 (2020).
162 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402 (plurality opinion).
163 Id. at 1431 (Alito, J., dissenting).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
167 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
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functions much in the same way it would if he had written for a majority. As
with any high-profile opinion, June Medical has commanded the attention of
many with a keen interest in its implications, both immediate and remote.
Four implications in particular have sufficient import to warrant discussion.
First, with the reinstatement of the undue burden standard as described
in Casey, it is likely that more challenged abortion laws will survive challenges
in court than if the benefits-burdens test were applied. The Chief Justice
intimated as much in his June Medical concurrence when he expressed agreement with the four dissenters that the validity of admitting privileges depends
on factors that vary by state.168 Thus, June Medical does not doom admittingprivileges laws—though it does seem to deliver them a blow. After June Medical, states remain free to pass admitting-privileges laws. What’s more, at least
some courts will now assess their validity under the undue burden standard
rather than the benefits-burdens balancing test. Because judicial consideration of the benefits of admitting-privileges laws has factored so heavily into
their consistent invalidation,169 courts may be less likely—in the absence of
considerations of benefits—to invalidate admitting-privileges (and other)
laws under the substantial obstacle/undue burden test.
Second, now that the Marks rule has been injected into one of the most
contentious lines of Supreme Court cases, it cannot escape both public and
judicial scrutiny. Because abortion laws are often challenged, and because
courts now have the “vexing task”170 of performing Marks analyses of the June
Medical decision, the Marks rule will most likely be receiving much more airtime than it has previously enjoyed. And because future circuit court decisions can likely only exacerbate the current circuit split, the Supreme Court’s
awareness of the practical infelicities of the Marks rule will be heightened.
While a few Justices have expressed various qualms about various applications of Marks,171 the views of the others are not discernable, and it is
unclear if the Court will even take on the task of reconsidering Marks in the
near future. However, the injection of Marks into already fraught abortion
jurisprudence, coupled with the increasing application of Marks among
lower courts, does suggest that the rule may be approaching its breaking
point. If, on the other hand, Marks endures, there may be an increase in
what might be called “Marks-conscious judging,” in which judges (and Justices) engage in clever and intentional exploitation of the Marks mechanism
to ensure that their opinions attain precedential effect.172 The implications
168 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2141 n.6 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
169 See, e.g., id. at 2130–32 (plurality opinion); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016).
170 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., PSC v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 431 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1994)).
171 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403–04 (2020) (plurality opinion);
Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1778–79 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
172 Whether or not the Chief Justice was engaged in Marks-conscious judging in June
Medical is indeterminable and does not matter with respect to the question of whether and
how the Marks rule applies to his opinion. But note that in the first footnote to his June
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of an increase in Marks-conscious judging would have considerable effects on
judicial economy and ought to be explored elsewhere.
Third, the Chief Justice, along with the dissenters, seems to be participating in an effort to push abortion law back to the domain of the states.173
What lurks under the surface of June Medical is the fact that the State of Louisiana did not ask the Court to reconsider the Casey standard. Both Justice
Kavanaugh and the Chief Justice chose to highlight this fact, even though it
was not directly necessary to do so in reaching their respective conclusions.174 Because the Court is not a self-starting institution, its decisions for
the most part stay within the boundaries sketched out by the parties in their
briefs. Thus, it would seem that some Justices in June Medical recognized
Casey as the governing standard only begrudgingly and because the parties’
briefs constrained them in their ability to do otherwise. Although they
inspire mere speculation, the apparent signals from certain Justices about
Casey will not be lost on strategic litigants in future abortion cases.
Fourth, it appears that all five Justices in the majority—especially Chief
Justice Roberts—regard the finding of a substantial obstacle largely as a factual question for the district court, which appellate courts review “only for
clear error.”175 Thus, future litigants in cases involving a challenged abortion restriction have all the more incentive to build a strong record at the
district court level with which to prove or rebut a substantial-obstacle claim.
CONCLUSION
After June Medical, the Flying Dutchman that is U.S. abortion law—
vagrant and heretofore unable to settle at any jurisprudential port—appears
to sail in yet a new direction. Because Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in
June Medical most plausibly represents the “narrowest” judgment-supportive
reasoning under each version of the Marks rule, his opinion has a much better claim to precedential effect than Justice Breyer’s plurality. In effect, the
judgment of Whole Woman’s Health is now binding precedent on future cases
that are sufficiently factually similar, and the reasoning of Casey—including its
Medical concurrence the Chief Justice points out how the Marks rule applies to Casey. June
Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2135 n.1. The Marks rule, then, was at least within his contemplation as
he wrote his concurrence.
173 See SNEAD, supra note 30, at 167 (describing some of the factors behind this
phenomenon).
174 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2182
n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our abortion
precedents are grievously wrong and should be overruled.”).
175 Id. at 2141 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018)); see also id. at 2132 (plurality
opinion) (“We conclude, in light of the record, that the District Court’s significant factual
findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have ample evidentiary support. None is
‘clearly erroneous.’ Given the facts found, we must also uphold the District Court’s related
factual and legal determinations. These include its determination that Louisiana’s law
poses a ‘substantial obstacle’ to women seeking an abortion.”).
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undue burden standard—is now binding on all future cases involving challenged abortion restrictions and regulations.
At least, so much is true for now. If anything is clear from the history of
America’s judicially crafted abortion law, it is its propensity to change. And it
is impossible to predict from which angle change may come. In the context
of abortion law after June Medical, the Court may reconsider the Marks rule—
perhaps in an unrelated case—thus indirectly determining the precedential
force of the two majority opinions. Alternatively, the Court may continue on
what seems to be a path toward placing the regulation of abortion back in the
domain of state law. What is certain is that the limits of June Medical will be
explored in future cases.
If the Court did finally settle upon one version of the Marks rule, commonsense dictates that it would likely be a version already applied in some of
the lower courts. And since each version of Marks recommends according
precedential effect to the Chief Justice’s concurrence in June Medical, the
Chief Justice’s return to the undue burden standard would remain intact no
matter which version of the rule the Court may settle on. It seems highly
unlikely that the Court would abolish the rule altogether, although it may
elect to reinforce its limits.176 It is also unclear, on the other hand, whether
the Court will refashion abortion law in any major way that would amount to
a total relinquishment of its stronghold over abortion law to the states.
The Chief Justice has attempted to fix the law at the undue burden standard of Casey; whether or not he succeeds in the long run depends on a
number of unpredictable factors. But at least under the Marks rule, his concurrence binds. The apparent compromise that Chief Justice Roberts struck
in June Medical is likely equally dissatisfying for policymakers, citizens, and
litigants on both sides of the abortion debate, yet that compromise is now the
law. The ship of Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence careens forward,
again flying the flag of Casey’s undue burden standard, making its way toward
some unknown port—or else, the bottom of the sea.

176

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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